Journal of Retracing Africa
Volume 2 | Issue 1

Article 16

January 2016

Muehlenbeck, Philip E. Betting on the Africans:
John F. Kennedy’s Courting of African Nationalist
Leaders. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
333pp.
Danielle Sanchez
dcsanchez86@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://encompass.eku.edu/jora
Part of the African Languages and Societies Commons
Recommended Citation
Sanchez, Danielle. "Muehlenbeck, Philip E. Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy’s Courting of African Nationalist Leaders.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 333pp.." Journal of Retracing Africa: Vol. 2, Issue 1 (2015): 102-104.
https://encompass.eku.edu/jora/vol2/iss1/16

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Encompass. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Retracing Africa by an
authorized editor of Encompass. For more information, please contact Linda.Sizemore@eku.edu.

102 | Book Reviews

Muehlenbeck, Philip E. Betting on the Africans: John F.
Kennedy’s Courting of African Nationalist Leaders. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012, xxi + 333 pp.
In Betting on the Africans, Muehlenbeck focuses on President John F. Kennedy’s
relationships with a number of prominent African leaders to analyze his efforts to
improve US-Africa relations during his presidency (January 20, 1961 - November
22, 1963). From the outset, Muehlenbeck contrasts “Kennedy’s policies of courting
Third World nationalism” to the subsequent abandonment of these efforts in a larger
shift towards an agenda focused on “Cold War concerns of anticommunism” that
dominated other administrations (xiv). This is significant because, as Muehlenberg
asserts, the shift away from Kennedy’s policies and ideologies relating to Africa
and the developing world facilitated a considerable growth in anti- Americanism
in subsequent presidencies (xiv).
Muehlenbeck carefully navigates the historiography of mid-twentieth
century US-Africa relations by squarely situating this work as an effort to balance
“modernization theory with personal diplomacy” (xv). As a result, Muehlenbeck
seeks to consider Kennedy as a deeply strategic, yet highly personable figure in
the construction of bonds between the US and Africa. Perhaps most importantly,
Muehlenbeck perceives decolonization as “the most important historical force
of the twentieth century,” thus, in gaining African leaders as allies, Kennedy had
the ability to gain great respect from Africans while strengthening foreign policy
(xvi). Ultimately, it is Muehlenbeck’s approach to Kennedy’s efforts in US-Africa
relations through personal diplomacy that is very striking because it emphasizes a
very different kind of diplomatic history that is underrepresented, especially within
the histories of Africa, the Cold War, and US relations with Africa and Africans.
While the book could have easily devolved into a series of disconnected
case studies in Cold War history, Muehlenbeck carefully crafts a framework for
considering the strengths and weaknesses of JFK’s personal diplomacy by first
beginning with a discussion of foreign policy under Eisenhower. Muehlenbeck
then shifts to the Kennedy administration and his approach to African nationalism
and US policy. After this somewhat prolonged introduction, Muehlenbeck delves
into Kennedy’s relationships with individual African leaders like Sékou Touré
of Guinea, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria. After
examining these spaces, Muehlenbeck transitions to a discussion that focuses on
the impact of Kennedy’s policies towards Africa and African nationalists, and how
these exchanges bled into other areas of domestic and foreign policy. For example,
Muehlenbeck gives considerable attention to the precarious nature of Kennedy’s
stance towards minority rule in South Africa.
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While Muehlenbeck attempts to center his dialogue on personal diplomacy,
there are critical issues with this approach. For example, Muehlenbeck makes
great effort to emphasize Kennedy’s early support for African nationalism,
especially during his years in Congress and the 1960 presidential campaign. Yet,
he essentially explains away the Congo Crisis, which is simply discussed through
the lens of how it influenced Kennedy’s relationships with other African leaders.
This is problematic because Muehlenbeck goes to great lengths to differentiate
Kennedy’s policies from other Cold War-era leaders, yet actions in the Congo or
(in)action in South Africa are not simply aberrations as Muehlenbeck asserts on
page xvi, they are indicative of an approach to diplomacy that was deeply personal
in some cases, but also very telling in the continuation of pro-Western policies that
sought to maintain stability and control in the midst of the Cold War.
While the bulk of Muehlenbeck’s limited discussion of the Congo Crisis
centers on Lumumba and his death in 1961, it seems as if there is a careful forgetting
of the fact that this conflict did not end after the death of Lumumba. There is no
sustained or meaningful engagement in an effort to make sense of the extreme
limitations of “personal diplomacy” in the case of the longer process of the Congo
Crisis. This is troubling because one cannot simply ignore the immense diplomatic
implications of the Congo Crisis because it was one of the most important conflicts
in the continent of Africa in the years immediately following independence.
Designating Kennedy’s stance in the Congo Crisis as an anomaly is problematic
because it downplays the significance of this horrific event in African history
within US policy. While Muehlenbeck provides an engaging and multi- faceted
approach to the various ways in which Kennedy practiced personal diplomacy, it is
difficult to label this as his dominant method of approaching African politics when
some of the most influential and troubling parts of US-Africa diplomacy existed
outside of this realm during the Kennedy presidency.
Nevertheless, Muehlenbeck’s work is very successful in a number of other
areas. Muehlenbeck’s chapter on the rivalry between Kennedy and De Gaulle
in Africa is especially noteworthy, as it carefully outlines the shifting nature of
US-French relations with the (re)construction of spheres of influence during the
early 1960s. As Muehlenbeck astutely assesses, De Gaulle “[envisioned] himself
as a protective shield from superpower hegemony and Kennedy [saw] himself as
a protective shield from French neocolonialism” (163). Thus, in continuation of
this theme, Muehlenbeck outlines subtle and not-so-subtle attempts to extend,
consolidate, or challenge influences in Africa from both the US and France.
While Muehlenbeck’s brief introduction to Francophone Africa’s affinity with
De Gaulle was a bit superficial, the chapter was very successful at capturing the
nuanced rivalry between the two leaders by carefully demarcating strategic spaces
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in Africa, analyzing motivations, exploring personalities, and assessing policies.
Additionally, Muehlenbeck’s discussion of US- France tensions that influenced
Peace Corps volunteers on the ground in Francophone Africa emphasized ways in
which international politics intersected with daily life in a very tangible manner.
Muehlenbeck’s chapter on Kennedy’s relationship with Sékou Touré was
intriguing because it emphasized the complex transformation of US-Guinea
relationships, as evidenced by the fact that Eisenhower previously dismissed the
Guinean leader as a communist (58). Thus, gaining a relationship with Guinea
was a bit more complex than using Kennedy’s charm to secure the allegiance of
a nation that was already friendly with the US. Yet, through the engaging and
well-researched chapter, Muehlenbeck presents the argument that Kennedy “was
able to not only influence Guinea back to a position of neutrality but by the end of
Kennedy’s life the Guinean leader had even become slightly pro-Western” (58). In
order to demonstrate this argument, Muehlenbeck chronicles debates over US aid
to Guinea, both from US and Guinean perspectives, Touré’s visit to Washington
in 1962, and the US Civil Rights related, and fabricated, controversy at the OAU
conference in Addis Ababa in 1963. By examining these episodes, Muehlenbeck
argues for the transformation of US-Guinea relations, which would ultimately
facilitate “Guinea’s support of John F. Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis,
the Congo crisis, and the outbreak of racial violence in the American south, and
they could judge Sékou Touré not only by what he did-but also what he said” (72).
This chapter is important because it is the first of five case studies of Kennedy’s
personal diplomacy with some African nations. Yet, as the chapter on Kennedy
and Touré reveals, Kennedy’s relationships with these leaders varied greatly and
provided a range of political opportunities for all actors.
Overall, Muehlenbeck’s Betting on the Africans is an intriguing and
important work that emphasizes the significance of personal diplomacy during
Kennedy’s presidency. While there are obvious issues with Muehlenbeck’s limited
discussions of the aforementioned aberrations, the book is largely successful in
its efforts to shift towards a different type of Cold War politics, namely, one that
focused on Kennedy’s personal diplomacy. While there are many books on Africa
and the Cold War, I am confident that this monograph will be an important source
of information for scholars and students interested in international diplomacy,
Africa, and the Cold War.
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